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BACKGROUND
The Canadian Arctic Islands and intervening channels are
known to be rich in hydrocarbon resources. The combined
Hecla and Drake Point discoveries of Sabine Peninsula on
Melville Island have recoverable and marketable natural
gas reserves estimated at almost 9 trillion cubic feet (Tcf).
Proven reserves for the western Sverdrup Basin, drilled
and delineated by industry exploration between 1969 and
the early 1980s, are 17.5 Tcf gas and 1.9 billion barrels
(bbl) of oil while total resources for Sabine Peninsula and
western Sverdrup basin are estimated at 44 to 50 Tcf gas
and 3.5 to 5.5 billion bbl oil (Chen et al., 2000). The
Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) has recently
released a report (Chan et al., 2005) which indicates that
transportation of proven Melville Island gas is economi-
cally viable for development scenarios involving either
liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker shipments to the east-
ern seaboard of North America or compressed natural gas
(CNG) vessels to a Mackenzie Valley pipeline. In spite of
these findings, however, there is still significant industry
reluctance to develop the gas resources of the Arctic
Islands.
This paper describes specific industry concerns with the
development of Arctic Islands resources. Data were gath-
ered during telephone interviews with exploration and
development managers representing six medium-to-large
domestic and multinational energy companies operating
on the Arctic frontiers of North America. The issues
discussed were identified in a Natural Resources Canada
study entitled “Reducing the Geoscientific, Environmen-
tal and Regulatory Barriers to Exploration, Transportation
and Development of Energy in the Arctic Islands.” The
approach taken for each interview was to provide some
historical background on the topic, explain the purpose of
the interview, and then ask respondents’ opinions on
which issues are most significant in accounting for the
failure to renew exploration in Canada’s Far North and the
lack of progress on developing existing proven reserves.
It became apparent with the first interview that some
issues, such as the lack of development infrastructure and
certain regulatory problems, could be considered true
barriers to energy development in the Arctic Islands, but
other issues were viewed as either hurdles or mere irri-
tants. It also became very clear that the potential solutions
available to government scientists and regulatory agencies
cover a broad spectrum. The paper concludes with specific
recommendations for future work.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Transportation Infrastructure
Lack of transportation infrastructure was cited by all of
respondents as the most significant barrier to energy de-
velopment and renewed exploration in the Arctic Islands.
In so far as the distance to market, hostile climate and
related working conditions for development, short ship-
ping season, and ongoing ecological risks are the root
cause of the lack of infrastructure, then this issue can be
readily identified as the dominant environmental issue.
Since the transportation of oil by tanker from the Bent
Horn field on Cameron Island has been proven feasible,
the present transportation issue relates primarily to the
movement of what is often referred to as “stranded gas.”
This gas includes proven reserves that fill the large Drake
and Hecla gas fields of Sabine Peninsula on northern
Melville Island and the various other pools of western
Sverdrup Basin. The CERI report of Chan et al. (2005) was
viewed as a useful starting point for addressing the trans-
portation feasibility issue. However, several respondents
felt that a full technological analysis of all the transporta-
tion options is still required. Similarly, there is still no
clear understanding as to whether stranded Arctic gas
would be moved by pipeline, LNG or CNG tanker, or by
some combination of the above methods. A minority view
is that even the use of submarine technology cannot yet be
ruled out.
 The lack of infrastructure will sideline all exploration
and development in Canada’s Far North as long as there
are other frontier areas that can link to developing infra-
structure (i.e., new pipelines) and provide a return on
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investment within 5 years for medium-to-large size do-
mestic companies and within 15 years for the largest
multinational corporations. For the latter group of compa-
nies, the accessible Arctic frontiers at present include parts
of Arctic Russia, the Barents Shelf, West Greenland, the
Brooks Range Foothills, and the North Slope of Alaska.
Since the Beaufort-Mackenzie Basin is only now seeing
renewed exploration interest by a few of the largest com-
panies, in spite of growing expectations of a new pipeline
to the region, the implication is that industry currently
views infrastructure and development in the Arctic Islands
as highly unlikely within the next 15 years. This situation
will remain unchanged unless there is serious considera-
tion of the many regulatory issues associated with frontier
exploration and development.
Ecological Sensitivity
An issue for renewed energy development in the Cana-
dian Arctic is the potential for unfavourable press. To
paraphrase one respondent, “Why would I want the name
of our company dragged through the mud by hostile media
and unforgiving investors?” The risk of images showing
oil spilled on ice or oil-soaked sea birds is sufficient reason
for all medium-size companies and many of the larger
players to avoid any areas perceived as ecologically sensi-
tive. Several respondents noted the continued moratorium
on critical transportation access routes, including Lancas-
ter Sound, which lies at the eastern end of the Northwest
Passage and remains the key to access for potential tanker
traffic between Arctic Islands gas sources and markets on
the eastern seaboard or in western Europe. Of course, this
essay is concerned with the transportation of stranded gas
and, while there are certainly ecological risks associated
with moving any commodity by ship through environmen-
tally sensitive waterways, it is fair to say that the risks are
not the same for gas in any form as they are for crude oil.
While most respondents considered ecological sensi-
tivity to be a true barrier, others considered it a hurdle that
is part of doing business in the world’s frontier areas.
Another view was that what may appear to be a mere
hurdle prior to initiating frontier development can become
an insurmountable barrier as the process of development
proceeds. The example of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline
is frequently cited as a case in point. Consideration of
ecological sensitivities along the pipeline route has created
ever lengthening delays in development, many of them
unforeseen. Many in industry consider the Mackenzie
Valley pipeline development as a litmus test for Canadian
frontier energy development in general. The process so far
has been filled with difficulties, brought on in large part by
a defective and ambiguous regulatory process. This situa-
tion does not bode well for the chances of gas development
in the Arctic Islands, particularly when one also considers
that the world is filled with sensitive ecosystems, many of
which are administered by governments that accept these
risks and yet encourage resource development.
Several respondents indicated that the largest corpora-
tions are less sensitive to “bad press” concerning ecologi-
cal issues and that certain foreign national petroleum
companies can, supposedly, afford to ignore outcries from
unsympathetic media sources. If this is true, then Arctic
gas may be shipped to market only when there are devel-
opment agreements in place between the territorial gov-
ernments and the largest offshore companies.
REGULATORY ISSUES
Lack of Regulatory Process
Our interviews indicated that environmental issues, as
described above, are enough to prevent all medium-size
companies and many larger ones from also having to
consider the other barriers, hurdles, and irritants associ-
ated with Arctic energy development. Companies that
identify the regulatory regime as part of the problem have
firsthand experience on developments such as the Mac-
kenzie Valley pipeline project. Apparent lack of regula-
tory process has been cited as the most significant problem.
Partners in the Mackenzie Valley pipeline project point to
the proliferation of official governing bodies, land claim-
ants, non-government interest groups (NGOs), lawyers,
and regulatory process “consultants” as contributing to the
problem. The federal body responsible for setting regula-
tory process is described by one of our respondents as an
agency “flying by the seat of its pants.”
The regulatory problem is understood to be a product of
the fallout from Canada’s former National Energy Pro-
gram (NEP). When the Canadian government withdrew
from the business of supporting Arctic exploration after
1984, it also adopted a hands-off approach to future devel-
opment in the region, leaving emerging frontier energy
companies to deal directly with both Native land claimants
and a vast array of non-industry stakeholders. The compa-
nies legitimately felt that some of this negotiation was not
their responsibility and were, until recently, willing to stop
pipeline construction planning until the federal govern-
ment took responsibility for settling outstanding land
claims, sovereignty, and royalty-sharing agreements (to
name just a few of the issues).
 While it is too early to assess the significance of the
apparent change of federal policy concerning involvement
in the energy development process, it is clear to some
industry respondents that the Canadian government’s views
on energy development are highly ambiguous. While the
federal government recognizes that frontier energy pro-
duction will bring economic benefits to Northerners and
all Canadians, competing interests such as the need to
protect sensitive ecosystems and traditional lifestyles of
Northerners are considered equally important. While na-
tional governments in the circumpolar area may continue
to wrestle with these issues, some nations, most notably
Denmark and Norway, also realize that a stable, long-term
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regulatory policy and process will encourage new energy
development in the North.
Sovereignty and Revenue Sharing
Sovereignty issues were viewed by several respondents
as a barrier to renewed energy development in the Far
North; others considered them to be an irritant. Interna-
tional sovereignty issues, specifically, were viewed as a
future development problem for the Canadian Arctic Is-
lands. The example of the dispute with the United States
over transportation access to the Northwest Passage was
cited as an early symptom of a potential future struggle to
establish sovereignty over offshore resources. Other ex-
amples include the recent new claim of France to a larger
share of the continental shelf and its resources south of St.
Pierre and Miquelon on Canada’s East Coast and the
continuing moratorium on exploration in the western Beau-
fort Sea associated with the disputed offshore interna-
tional boundary between Yukon and Alaska.
 Territorial sovereignty issues are also seen as a future
problem for Arctic energy development. Several respond-
ents noted that the boundary between Nunavut and the
Northwest Territories passes through the Hecla gas field of
northern Sabine Peninsula. In planning for territorial par-
tition in the late 1990s (when Nunavut was created from
within the eastern part of the former Northwest Territo-
ries), this division may have seemed a reasonable compro-
mise for the sharing of resources between the two new
administrations. The decision now guarantees that there
will be disputes over ownership and royalty payments
when production facilities are planned to draw gas from
one side of the pool or the other.
Right of access to production royalties will also become
apparent when a development decision is made. Non-
government organizations, which at present have not ex-
pressed an interest in these resources, will claim a partial
right to compensation or a percentage of royalty payments
when the value of the resource is more generally known.
A significant task for the federal government is to settle
the major sovereignty issues in the Arctic Islands and to
establish revenue-sharing agreements involving the terri-
tories and the identifiable NGOs. This process should be
viewed as a fundamental part of developing and maintain-
ing a stable and unambiguous regulatory regime: one that
clearly states the rules of engagement for future investors
in Canada’s North.
Investment Climate
Poor investment climate was viewed by some respond-
ents as a barrier to energy development in the North; others
viewed this problem as a hurdle or, for smaller companies,
as yet another set of exploration irritants. Two aspects of
the problem were identified.
The lack of tax incentives for northern exploration was
cited as one example of an unfavourable investment cli-
mate. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the federal government
heavily sponsored Arctic exploration as part of its national
energy policy. When these subsidies were withdrawn,
after the National Energy Program ended in 1984, the
ability to explore in the North also ended. It is clear,
therefore, that favourable tax regimes can encourage fron-
tier development. However, the downside to the previous
attempt at this type of government intervention in the
energy business—that is, the controlling of high energy
prices for the short-term benefit of consumers—is still
viewed with anger and resentment by the energy resource
sector (and by the public in general) throughout western
Canada. The obvious solution to this dilemma is for fed-
eral and territorial governments to consider an enlightened
regime of tax incentives that are not linked to downstream
energy price controls. The resulting improvement of in-
vestment climate will send a message to investors that
Arctic Canada is open for business. The corollary is that a
clearly stated regulatory regime will establish specific
social and environmental rules of engagement for the
anticipated new business.
The second detrimental aspect of the investment cli-
mate noted by our respondents was the dominance and
favoured status attached to investment trusts in Canada.
While these vehicles for investment may suit an increas-
ingly conservative generation, now dominated by greying
and retiring baby boomers, investment trusts cannot place
investment funds in high-risk opportunities such as Arctic
energy development. The solution to this problem is for
the federal government to recognize that higher-risk in-
vestments are important for the long-term economic health
of the country and modify the tax regime to reflect this
fact.
Ownership
PetroCanada, through its acquisition of Panarctic Oils
Limited, is now the principal leaseholder of all the “sig-
nificant discovery licences” (SDLs) in Canada’s Arctic
Islands. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Panarctic managed
a significant proportion of the exploration and successful
drilling of the best Arctic Islands prospects. Apart from the
federal government, which was the largest investor in
Panarctic, there were hundreds of additional shareholders,
including many small and medium-size companies and
also individuals. The proportionate interest of each of
these investors varies between SDLs. According to one
respondent, the total number of investors in the Panarctic
discoveries is close to 400. The highly divided nature of
the Arctic Islands SDLs has been noted as a development
issue by most respondents, but a determined large com-
pany would consider it more an accounting headache than
a barrier to renewed exploration and development.
One respondent suggested adjusting the regulatory proc-
ess to encourage development of stranded gas reserves
where credible technical reports have shown these re-
serves to be economically viable. The encouragement to
SDL leaseholders and associated investors could take the
form of a “maintenance charge” paid by leaseholders to the
federal regulatory agency. The charges would be waived
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when the leaseholders produce detailed technical reports
demonstrating the continuing lack of viability of their
lease-held reserves. The government could use the main-
tenance fees collected for successful exploration to fund
research that would investigate outstanding transporta-
tion, social, and environmental issues associated with
moving Arctic gas to market.
GEOSCIENTIFIC ISSUES
All respondents considered geoscientific issues to be
insignificant when stacked against the transportation and
related environmental barriers to accessing stranded Arc-
tic Islands gas and the ambiguous and unfavourable regu-
latory environment for Canadian frontier exploration and
development. Nevertheless, most respondents also felt
that federal and territorial government agencies can do
much to promote Arctic energy potential more effectively,
using a wide range of geoscientific and related map-based
social and environmental data sets.
Promotional Process
One respondent noted that much of the expertise in the
Arctic Islands has now disappeared from the Canadian oil
and gas exploration business and that, without some sig-
nificant new stimulus, companies are unlikely to train a
new generation of employees in a high-risk frontier region
with no foreseeable development infrastructure. While an
improved regulatory regime alone may encourage some
companies to re-evaluate this policy, it is also important
that the federal and territorial governments take a unified
but multi-pronged approach to promoting and stimulating
new exploration and development. Greenland was cited as
a particularly effective example. (1) A government-influ-
enced corporation (TGS-Nopec) undertakes marine seis-
mic acquisition; (2) The federal geological survey (GEUS)
generates geoscience data sets tailored to industry needs;
(3) TGS publishes the government-generated data and
markets, for profit, large thematic and geoscience synthe-
sis datasets (i.e., basin atlases); (4) through an enlightened
regulatory regime, the government expresses its desire to
preserve habitat and maintain traditional Native lifestyles;
(5) TGS undertakes exploration in partnership with the
private sector; and (6) TGS continuously promotes new
exploration opportunities through high-profile advertis-
ing at all major industry conventions (e.g., Association of
American Petroleum Geologists) and by sending company
teams on promotional tours to prospective industry part-
ners across Europe and North America.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Environmental Issues
Both industry and government should view encourag-
ing research into the feasibility of transporting stranded
gas in Canada’s Arctic as a priority. They should begin this
process by initiating a dialogue between industry
stakeholders and the university research community re-
garding specific topics of research. Faculties of marine
science, engineering, and environmental design would
appear to be logical places to start. Research opportunities
can be encouraged with modest financial support from
industry and the national funding agencies (i.e., the Natu-
ral Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada).
While social issues and ecological sensitivity are recog-
nized as major concerns for Arctic energy development, it
is also well known that not all ecosystems are equally
fragile or equally threatened by regulated forms of devel-
opment. Although there is an industry perception that
Arctic ecosystems and related health and safety issues are
well known and understood, the relevant information on
these topics is scattered. A logical first step to understand-
ing these problems would be studies to identify health and
safety baselines and to produce maps of sensitive habitats
for a range of significant Arctic flora and fauna. The focus
would be on potential transportation routes both onshore
and offshore, and on potentially affected communities.
Since habitats can also be seasonally sensitive, mapping of
habitat sensitivity throughout the year should also be
considered. A starting point for this work would be to
examine what has been accomplished to date by producing
GIS products that link published ecosystem and environ-
mental studies to study localities across Arctic Canada.
Regulatory Issues
A significant barrier to renewed Arctic energy develop-
ment is a perceived lack of regulatory process. To correct
this problem, a careful examination of successful regula-
tory process in competing foreign jurisdictions around the
Arctic would be a useful starting point. Key nations in-
volved in the regulation of Arctic energy development
include Denmark and Greenland, Norway, the United
States, and Russia. Comparative studies should be carried
out in close cooperation with the significant Canadian
regulatory agencies, but the principal territorial
stakeholders should also formally acknowledge that they
support the investigative process.
The federal government must view resolution of sover-
eignty issues as a high priority. This includes 1) issues
involving the United Nations Commission on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) in what are currently international
waters, and 2) specific international disputes relevant to
Canadian Arctic gas, especially the question of access to
the Northwest Passage and related uncertainties (if any)
concerning access to offshore energy resources located in
the inter-island channels of the Arctic Islands.
It is expected that there will be territorial and Native
land-claim disputes over revenue sharing derived from
future Arctic energy production, particularly where known
energy reserves are transected by the Nunavut–Northwest
Territories boundary (as in the case of the Hecla gas field
on Sabine Peninsula). These questions should be settled
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early so that all stakeholders know the value of their
resources and can make, or even promote, appropriate
development decisions based on this foreknowledge.
The case for an improved investment climate to encour-
age frontier energy development need not carry the odour
of the long-terminated National Energy Program. The
main objective should be frontier energy development tax
incentives, or justifiable maintenance charges to signifi-
cant discovery leaseholders, without the artificial price
controls to consumers. A second method to encourage
frontier development is to reduce or eliminate the tax
advantages currently given to Canadian investment trusts
and to use some of those advantages in areas that will
stimulate higher-risk investments on the frontier.
Geoscientific Issues
The purpose of addressing geoscientific issues is to
create a favourable climate for new investment in the
Canadian Arctic by coordinating the acquisition, delivery,
and promotion of a wide range of specialized geoscience
information. Most products can draw on existing scattered
data sources and do not require new fieldwork.
CONCLUSIONS
Interviews with geoscience representatives of medium-
and large-size Canadian petroleum producers indicate that
the principal barriers to development of proven gas re-
serves in the Canadian Arctic Islands are (1) social and
environmental issues that prevent the construction of an
appropriate transportation infrastructure and (2) a hostile
regulatory regime. This paper recommends that the federal
government encourage research on specific technological
issues associated with proposed transportation systems for
stranded Arctic gas, as well as production of social/envi-
ronmental and ecosystem maps of potential transportation
corridors. Also recommended, as a prelude to regulatory
reform, is a careful evaluation of regulatory regimes in
other circum-Arctic nations currently shown to be effec-
tive. The objectives of regulatory reform should be to:
1) establish stable, long-term guidelines for environ-
mental protection and resource development;
2) commit to revenue- sharing agreements with Arctic
stakeholders,
3) resolve emerging and potential international and
territorial boundary disputes that may involve
Arctic and offshore resources, and
4) create a tax regime that encourages high-risk
frontier energy development, but does not
jeopardize industry support by artificially
controlling the price consumers pay for energy.
Respondents to our telephone interviews indicated that
geoscience issues were not barriers to the development of
stranded Arctic gas. However, it is generally acknowledged
that the coordinated acquisition, delivery, and promotion
of a wide range of specialized geoscientific information by
territorial and federal agencies can have a profoundly
stimulating effect on new frontier energy developments,
especially when this work is undertaken in a stable and
encouraging regulatory regime and where issues of
transportation access and environmental hazards are either
known or are being assessed.
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